Implementation of the NPT 13+2 Steps:
REPORT CARD ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
The Japanfs Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, a separate sheet,
is an assessment, from Japanese citizensf perspectives, of the
Japanese governmentfs efforts from May 20, 2000 to February 16,
2002 for the implementation of the 13+2 steps, that is, the thirteen
practical steps to implement article VI, plus two steps which are
deeply connected to Japan among the steps on article VII, contained
in the Final Document of 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that was adopted by
consensus in May 2000.
This gAnnex: Explanation of the Reason of Evaluationh is to explain
the details of the task setting and the grounds for evaluation. It
also aims to serve as a practical briefing book to provide an annual
overview of the Japanese and global efforts towards nuclear
disarmament. The issuance of the Report Card will be continued every
year until 2005, when the next NPT Review Conference will be held.
The evaluation was made by the Evaluation Committee, consisting of the
following ten members.
(In alphabetical order)
Former Mayor of Hiroshima City
Tokyo International University
Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition
YWCA of Japan
Member of the House of Councilors
President, Nagasaki University
Tokyo Gakugei University
Peace Depot (Chair
of the Committee)
KAWASAKI Akira, Peace Depot
A: Japan has tackled its core task of eliminating dependence on nuclear weapons, or has made a significant contribution for global nuclear disarmament.
B: Japan has been enthusiastic in tackling the important tasks (underlined in the text of this Annex).
C: Japan has carried out some of the tasks.
D: Japan carried out none or very few of the tasks. Fortunately, this did not constitute a direct factor setting back the global situation.
E: Japan carried out none of the important tasks. Or even if Japan carried out some of them, it failed to make the most of its precious opportunity as a country devastated by nuclear weapons.
bold section which follows the short title of each of the 13+2 Steps
below is the exact quote from the NPT Final Document. The section
in bold italics represents tasks, and those that we regard are
particularly important (gthe important tasksh) are underlined.
Entry-into-Force of the CTBT
The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications,
without delay and without conditions and in accordance with
constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry-into-force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
TASK 1: At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Second
Conference on the Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT (CTBT
EIF Conference), Japan should repeatedly call for the early entry into
force, including a call for gentry into force before 2003.h Also, it
should support similar proposals when they are submitted by other
TASK 2: Japan should repeatedly push the Bush administration to ratify
the CTBT, by pointing out past agreements between the US and Japan, as
well as by reminding it of Japanese public opinion in support of nuclear
disarmament and the fundamentals of the policy of the Government of
TASK 3: Japan should work hard at the Second CTBT EIF Conference to urge
the US to ratify the Treaty.
TASK 4: The GOJ should make systematic and constant efforts to promote
ratification of the CTBT by the twelve states other than the US which
have not yet ratified, but whose ratification is required for the EIF,
through means appropriate to each state. It is recommended that an
expert team be formed to each of the twelve in order to find such means.
5: Japan should strengthen its technical cooperation with the
Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and work actively for its constant
1 (Call for a 2003 Time Frame)
The number of CTBT signatories increased from 155 to 165, and the number of ratifiers from 61 to 89 during the period from May 20, 2000 to February 16, 2002, or the grelevant periodh of this report. Although it is welcome that the number of the State parties is steadily increasing, there has been a lack of progress during this period in the fact that thirteen of the forty-four states required for the entry into force (EIF) of the CTBT have not ratified it yet. In this regard, we have to say that there has been no concrete progress towards an early EIF.
Of the thirteen states, three – India, Pakistan, and the Democratic Peoplefs Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) – have not signed it. The remaining ten – Algeria, China, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Vietnam – have signed but not ratified it.
The Japanese government has long made the early EIF of the CTBT a core diplomatic priority . In particular, it proposed to set a time frame for the EIF in its UNGA resolution in 2000, entitled gA Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weaponsh (A/55/33R, November 20, 2000. We will call it the eA Pathf Resolution.). It was jointly submitted by Japan and Australia and gained overwhelming support. It stressed the importance of gthe early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States, especially by the States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, with a view to its early entry into force before 2003.h Several of the non-ratifying thirteen states voted in favor of the resolution: Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia, Iran, the US, and Vietnam. In other words, at that time, these six states had the intention, at the administrative level, to ratify the treaty before 2003.
Therefore, although the change of the policy by the new US administration posed greater difficulties, the Government of Japan (GOJ) was requested, at least in 2001, to maintain this positive policy and incorporate it into the text of the 2001 UNGA eA Pathf Resolution and appeal Japanfs aspirations to the international community at the Second CTBT EIF Conference.
2 and 3 (Call on the US)
The failure of the United States to ratify the CTBT is a particularly serious impediment to the EIF of the Treaty. For the three current non-signatories, in particular, the fact that the worldfs largest nuclear power refuses to ratify it can be a major rationale for rejecting the credibility of the Treaty. While the US Senatefs rejection of the CTBT ratification in October 1999 had cast a dark shadow on its early EIF, the situation worsened during the relevant period of this report. The Bush Administration, which came to power in January 2001, suggested a policy to let the CTBT fade away (Ari Fleischer, Spokesman for the White House, and Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the Department of State, July 9, 2001). However, it was also to be noted that more than half of the U.S. Senate, though an insufficient number for the two-thirds requirement for ratification, supported the CTBT at that time, according to a survey conducted by a US NGO.
Under such circumstances, the true value of the Japanfs diplomacy towards the US faced a test, as a close US ally and a strong advocate of the CTBT. Nuclear disarmament should always be given great importance in the Japanese governmentfs vision of global security, in so far as the Japanese representatives to the UN have repeatedly emphasized that gJapan is the only country that has suffered from nuclear devastationh in their speeches. Therefore, the Japanese government should not act differently as the US Administration changes, but should act on its own initiative, based on the recognition that the CTBT is an issue at the heart of the US-Japan security relationship. In addition, this stance should be clearly visible to the public of Japan.
4 (Call on states other than the US)
While it is essential to logically criticize the US nuclear weapon policy per se in order to call for a US policy change on the CTBT, it is necessary, at the same time, to contain the US government using international public opinion. One such approach would be to advance the universality of the CTBT, by making the number of State parties increase. Pushing for ratification by the twelve states required for the EIF other than the US is particularly important. Since each of the twelve is under different conditions regarding CTBT ratification, the specific measures to overcome the difficulties will be different. In addition, their diplomatic relationships with Japan are different. Therefore, systematic efforts for each state should be pursued with assistance from a team of experts and NGOs.
5 (Cooperation with CTBTO)
One of the important tasks is to prepare to ensure that the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), including the international verification system, can function as soon as the treaty enters into force. The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO has been working since its foundation on November 19, 1996. If the US continues to refuse to ratify the CTBT, it might underfund the PrepCom. That is why Japan is urged to work actively for the maintenance of the PrepCom, not to mention to offer technical cooperation with it.
As for TASK 1, there was a setback in Japanfs policy during the relevant period of this report.
Japanese citizens welcomed the progress in the GOJfs nuclear disarmament policy from the paradigm of gultimate eliminationh to the paradigm of gunequivocal undertaking,h when the Japanese eA Pathf Resolution demonstrated some positive initiatives at the 2000 UNGA, including the 2003 time frame for the CTBT EIF. However, at a consultation meeting between Japanese citizen groups and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in a Diet Office Building, Tokyo on August 10, 2001, citizens discovered that the MOFA already had the intention to weaken the text of the 2001 UNGA draft resolution in order to get a eyesf vote, or an abstention at worst, from the Bush administration. Astonished at this finding, many citizens requested that the MOFA maintain the 2003 time frame call. The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki jointly submitted a request to the Prime Minister on September 6. Some municipalities adopted similar resolutions in their assemblies.
Despite of all of these efforts, the text of the 2001 eA Pathf Resolution draft submitted to the First Committee (A/C.1/56/L.35) demonstrated surprising setbacks. In order to obtain US support, it dropped even the call for gthe early EIF,h not to mention gthe 2003 time frame.h This development clearly demonstrated that Japanfs diplomacy on CTBT was pursued neither by deriving strength from the support of national public opinion, wishes from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor international public opinion, but was pursued solely through bargaining with the US behind closed doors, with the aim of obtaining the US support.
In this development, we should not overlook the fact that when Prime Minister Junichiro KOIZUMI himself referred to the 2000 UNGA eA Pathf Resolution and emphasized to the international community that he was committed to striving for the early EIF of the CTBT, as he spoke at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 2001, respectively, the MOFA bureaucrats were already about to draw back from the very resolution. This bears a relationship to the fundamental characteristics of Japanese diplomacy, which is often labeled gdiplomacy in the absence of citizensh or gdiplomacy in the absence of politicians.h It should be seriously questioned.
Fortunately, the GOJ revised the first draft and revived the phrase calling for gthe early EIFh (A/C.1/56/L.35/Rev.1). Later, an MOFA official in charge of the process told Peace Depot that they were not surprised at the US vote against the Japanfs resolution even after the revision, because they knew it would happen beforehand through advance negotiations. It can be rightly inferred that the MOFA revised the too notorious first draft and restored the early EIF call because they knew the US would vote eagainstf it anyway. But the MOFA did not revive the time frame call, probably because it wished to attain support from other nuclear weapon States. In fact, France and the UK voted in favor of the revised resolution.
It is understandable that they thought the 2003 time frame had become less realistic after the developments in the past year in international politics. However, even a year earlier, the possibility of achieving the EIF of the CTBT before 2003 was quite bleak, considering the policies of India, Pakistan and the DPRK. Nevertheless it was important that Japan had proposed such resolution because it was effective in exerting international pressure on the non-ratifiers.
In addition, considering that Japan had just moved to a new stage of disarmament diplomacy by submitting the eA Pathf Resolution in 2000 and that the symbolic core of the resolution was the proposal of a time frame for the EIF of the CTBT, the CTBT EIF was a key issue in judging the sincerity or lack thereof of Japanfs nuclear disarmament diplomacy. As a result, Japan has committed a serious failure in this task.
The above also relates to TASKS 2 and 3. The Japanese governmentfs attitude towards the US, which rejects the CTBT, has not been strict enough. The US clearly denounced the CTBT in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), partly released on January 9, 2002. On this occasion, the GOJ should have responded quickly, protesting this policy.
It is true that Japanfs position on the CTBT has been repeatedly explained to the US on various occasions, including the Powell-Tanaka meeting on January 20, 2002, but we cannot help but seriously question the GOJfs attitude toward the US. This is because it represents the inconsistency of the GOJes claim on the importance of the credibility of the US-Japan security relationship. When the GOJ decided to start joint research on the TMD with the US, it claimed that the joint research would improve trust in the US-Japan Security Arrangement (Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, December 25, 1998) If this is so, the GOJ should have clearly criticized the US CTBT policy, pointing out that the it would gundermine the trust of the US-Japan Security Arrangement.h The reason is as follows.
The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (April 17, 1996) clearly states that gboth governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the CTBT negotiations.h Furthermore, the US-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Verification, one of whose immediate priorities is gbringing about the early EIF of the CTBT,h was established on March 8, 2000. Both governments held uplifting press conference, saying, gtoday is a historic occasion,h in the joint press statement to announce the establishment of the Commission. Considering this recent history, Japan could and should have raised a strong objection to the US policy change on the CTBT.
In relation to TASK 3, Japan referred to the US only in a roundabout way at the 2nd CTBT EIF Conference in November 2001. Despite the diplomatic tradition not to identify states by name, even the EU criticized the US explicitly by name, saying, gwe can only regreth and gthis is all the more worrying,h and appealed to the Government of the US, urging it to review its position. Sweden gdeeply regret[ed] the US was the only country that did not vote in favor of the procedural decision on the CTBT in the UNGA First Committee, and stated it [did] not support the Treaty.h However, as for Japan, the only phrase referring the US position was the following in a speech given by Ambassador Nobuyasu ABE: gUnfortunately, there is no prospect at the moment for the early EIF of the CTBT, due in part to the hesitation of some of the major States to ratify it.h (November 12, 2001) The Final Declaration of the 2nd CTBT EIF Conference gcall[ed] upon the remaining two [nuclear weapon States (that is, the US and China)] to accelerate their ratification processes,h but failed to refer to the fact that the US openly expressed that it did not support the Treaty.
Generally speaking, Japan has gained fairly high appreciation from the diplomatic community, including concerned NGOs, with respect to its active involvement in the CTBT EIF Conference. However, from the viewpoint of Japanese citizens who have witnessed the recent series of actions taken by the GOJ regarding the CTBT, Japanfs nuclear disarmament policy would be regarded as a mere superficial performance played within the framework allowed by the US. We urge the GOJ to reflect seriously its conduct.
As for TASK 4, it is to be appreciated that the GOJ has been carrying out diplomatic efforts to promote CTBT ratification. Prior to the CTBT EIF Conference in August 2001, Japan's Foreign Minister Ms Makiko TANAKA sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of all states but North Korea whose ratification is required for the CTBT EIF, but that had not yet signed or ratified it. In addition, the MOFA explains that they have repeatedly made use of various opportunities to influence states to promote the CTBT EIF.
However, according to a response given by the GOJ to a question submitted by House of Councilors Member Atsuo NAKAURA in 2001, there seems to be neither a plan nor a system in Japanfs diplomatic efforts to promote CTBT ratification. It is recommended that the GOJ plan and implement more advanced efforts such as we suggested in TASK 4.
One significant example of relevant events is the decision made by the GOJ to equitf the economic sanctions on India and Pakistan (October 26, 2001). These measures were taken in protest toward the two states for conducting nuclear tests. But Japan followed the US in glifting the sanctionsh in order to encourage Pakistan to cooperate with the US in its military operations in Afghanistan, in response to the events of September 11, 2001 and to prevent regional instability in South Asia. However, neither India nor Pakistan has committed itself to a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. Both are openly pursuing the development of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Japan should have gained their commitment to stopping nuclear testing as a premise for lifting economic sanction, so that Japan could be consistent in its CTBT policy. India turned out to be one of the two states that voted against the Japanese resolution in the UNGA First Committee on November 5, 2001, soon after the sanctions were lifted.
In terms of TASK 5, Japan has repeatedly expressed its willingness to cooperate with the verification regime and to give assistance to the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). It should be noted that Japan is willing to be actively involved in this process.
summary, while recognizing that the GOJ has devoted much energy to
implement this step, the negative aspects of its record are quite
serious. Thus we give it a D grade on this item for the relevant period.
on Nuclear Weapon Tests
A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear
explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT.
1: At the UNGA and the Second CTBT EIF Conference, Japan should propose
that the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests be continued or should
support similar proposals made by other states. A sense of urgency is
2: Japan should repeatedly call upon India and Pakistan for a
continuation of the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests, while pressuring
them for ratification of the CTBT.
3: Japan should express concern that the construction of the US National
Ignition Facility (NIF) violates the spirit, and possibly even a
provision, of the CTBT, and should limit the cooperation of Japanese
companies with it.
1 and 2 (Call on states)
Generally speaking, signatories to the CTBT are not allowed to take actions contrary to the aims of the treaty even before its EIF (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Since the five nuclear-weapon States and Israel have signed the treaty, one may argue that brakes on testing are in place to some extent. However, there is another argument that as long as signatories can withdraw from the CTBT according to its provisions, signatories may resort to testing if the situation changes before the EIF. Therefore, there is no ground for optimism with regard to the continuation of the moratorium.
The Bush administration, which expressed a policy of letting the CTBT die, had nevertheless stated during its election campaign that it would continue the moratorium. However, there were arguments in the US that the manufacture of mini nukes (with yields of less than one kiloton) would require nuclear explosion tests. Moreover, it was reported that the US Department of Energy requested a budget to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear tests once the decision to do so was made.
In addition, the media reported that Russia might reconsider all the existing arms control treaties if the US went ahead with its missile defense program. Similarly, it was considered that China had growing incentives to resume nuclear tests, as it would think it necessary to strengthen its arsenal. India and Pakistan have said that they will keep the moratorium in place, but if China conducts tests, India, and then Pakistan, might follow.
Therefore, the GOJ should constantly reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear tests with a sense of urgency, at such forums as the UNGA and 2nd CTBT EIF Conference. At the same time, Japan should pursue other measures to promote the continuation of the test moratorium.
3 (Critical Position toward the NIF)
The planned nuclear tests at the US National Ignition Facility (NIF), which is currently under construction, might involve very small but sustained nuclear fusion reactions, and it is likely that they might violate the provisions of the CTBT. Clearly, they would be in contravention of the spirit of the CTBT. These tests are useful for research on nuclear weapons in secondary explosions, in which nuclear fusion plays a central role. If this is permitted, China, which does not have facilities such as the NIF, will claim the right to conduct nuclear explosion tests. The NIF may not directly violate the moratorium on nuclear tests, but it enhances risks that endanger the stability of the moratorium.
Against this backdrop, it was revealed that the US subsidiary of HOYA, a Japanese glass manufacturer, was producing major parts for the NIF. The mayors of Hiroshima (February 2001) and Nagasaki (April 2001) protested this. There were also several discussions in the Diet from May to June 2001. If the GOJ wants to attain the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons, it should be more sensitive to this kind of matter.
The GOJ, though moving backward on its policy on the CTBT, has maintained a consistent argument for the moratorium on nuclear tests thus far.
As for TASK 1, the government included a call for the continuation of the moratorium into the text of the UNGA eA Pathf Resolution from its first draft. Also, Ambassador ABE strongly called for the continuation of the moratorium at the 2nd CTBT EIF Conference, the Final Declaration of which included that call. We naturally appreciate such efforts. Fortunately, the recent US Nuclear Posture Review (January 9, 2002) also reaffirmed the continuation of the moratorium.
However, the situation surrounding the moratorium gives no grounds for optimism, for in the NPR the US made clear that it would reduce the preparation time necessary to resume nuclear tests substantially in the coming several years. In spite of the fact that the GOJ has been called upon to take measures to respond to the new situation with a sense of urgency, one cannot find any such sense of urgency in its attitude .
In addition, it is probable that most Japanese citizens feel that gJapanfs call for a moratorium at present is nothing but another example of the GOJ always following the US policy.h It should acknowledge the lack of citizensf trust as serious.
As for TASK 2, it was reported that the Japanese government was given promises by India and Pakistan that they would continue the moratorium on nuclear tests when it decided to lift the economic sanctions on them in October 2001. Later, the Japan-India Joint Declaration issued when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Tokyo (December 10, 2001) included the phrase gto continue the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testingh by India. Moreover, a remark made by President Musharraf that. gPakistan will not become the first country to resume nuclear testingh (November 26, 2001) is on the record of then Foreign Minister TANAKAfs report on her Pakistan visit. It can be said that the setback of the situation with respect to the moratorium by the two states has been checked so far.
As for TASK 3, the Japanese government has repeatedly explained that it has no authority to control the involvement of foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms in the NIF. It has not expressed concern over the NIF, nor has it made its position clear on the cooperation of Japanese private companies, including HOYA, with the NIF. We regard the GOJfs efforts on this task as insufficient.
As a whole, the lack of sense of urgency on the side of the GOJ
following the US announcement on the NPR is serious, and we give it a D
grade on this item.
Program of Work at the CD to Conclude the FMCT Within Five Years
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) in accordance with the
statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained
therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to
agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement
of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within
TASK 1: The GOJ should continue to submit United Nations General Assembly
resolutions with the contents of a gconclusion of the FMCT as early as
possible before 2005.h
TASK 2: The GOJ should pursue independent diplomatic efforts in order to
normalize the CD and also convene a panel of experts outside the CD to
identify the technical problems that can be tackled in the period before
the CD agrees on a program of work for a FMCT.
TASK 3: Japan should work towards the formulation of a global inventory
of all fissile materials possessed by states, whether for military or
1 (Call for 2005 time frame)
The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has continued since the adoption of the 2000 NPT Final Document, and no agreement has been reached on a program of work for a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
In the background of this impasse are two theories of linkages. The first involves links between nuclear disarmament talks and the FMCT, over the question of whether the two should take place in parallel at the CD. The argument of countries such as India and Pakistan is that without a clear nuclear disarmament program by the nuclear-weapon States, who already have fissile materials, it is impossible to go forward on a ban on production alone. In opposition to this, the nuclear-weapon States have protested vigorously against the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament.
Secondly, there is a dispute over the link between the prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the FMCT. On this issue, there is a sharp conflict between China, which emphasizes the urgency of PAROS, and the US, which is trying to avoid any debate being centered on missile defense.
The Japanese government considers the FMCT to be on par with the CTBT in terms of importance, and has pushed for its negotiation. At the UNGA in the autumn of 2000, Japan submitted a draft resolution calling for the FMCT, with the text of gconclusion as early as possible before 2005,h and attained overwhelming support. The Japanese government should strictly keep this position.
TASKS 2 and 3 (Normalization of the CD and outside work)
In order to obtain results within the deadline, it will be important to find the necessary conditions for normalizing the CD. There is also agreement for the CD to establish ga subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmamenth as will be mentioned in the next item. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the negative security assurances (NSA) has also been proposed: During the 1998 session, an NSA Ad Hoc committee was once established. All four Ad Hoc committees are to deal with important issues, and it would be appropriate to establish them loosely in parallel, with the premise that the agenda will not be fixed at their first stages, but will be developed gradually. Japan should make independent diplomatic efforts based on such a position.
At the same time, it is necessary to make technical preparations, outside the framework of the CD, to contribute to effective negotiations in the normalized CD. In particular, the formulation of an inventory of all fissile materials possessed by states, regardless of whether they are for military or commercial use, will be useful as the basis for FMCT negotiations. It would be appropriate to add these categories to the database of weapons of mass destruction held by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.
As for TASK 1, Japan submitted, at the 2001 session of the UNGA, a draft resolution with more concrete objectives than those in the 2000 resolution, and attained overwhelming support. It called for gthe establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD as early as possible during its 2002 session to negotiate [a FMCT] with a view to the conclusion within five years.h
It is inevitable that Japanfs maintenance of a positive FMCT policy consistent with the US policy will cloud our evaluation, considering that it made an unjust change in its CTBT policy to win US favor. However, we should appreciate the continuation of its positive attitude from the viewpoint that it contributes to activating the multilateral processes of nuclear disarmament, which are stalled as a whole.
In 2002, the US showed a positive attitude towards the CD, stating that criticizing the US as unilateralist was inappropriate and that it was committed to multilateral regimes. In this regard, the US stated that the FMCT negotiations should be the first step in moving the CD forward (January 24, 2002, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State). However, most of the states will remain skeptical and cautious when the President Bush keeps promoting tensions through various occasions including his State of the Union Address condemning the gaxis of evilh (January 29, 2002).
Therefore, in relation to TASK 2, it is particularly necessary for the Japanese government to present sufficient independence, and not to just follow the US, in its diplomacy at the CD. Unfortunately, no such impressive initiatives have been presented by the Japanese government at the CD. However, the speech by the Ambassador on Disarmament Seiichiro NOBORU at the first session of the 2002 CD, calling for overcoming the deadlock at the CD and calling strongly for support for the Amorim proposal (August 2000, CD/1624, named after the Brazilian ambassador) that includes the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for the FMCT negotiations, was notable in its sincerity and motivation. This should be fairly appreciated.
Some measures were made regarding the experts panel on the FMCT outside the CD. Actually, Japan and Australia co-sponsored a FMCT workshop in Geneva on May 14-15, 2001, in which officials and experts from about one hundred states participated. Views were exchanged on obligations, verification and organization of the treaty to be negotiated. There were several unofficial responses to the workshop finding that it lacked a sense of purpose and leadership or that it was not open enough. We should keep watching how these lessons will be reflected in the next step.
As to TASK 3, there is no information to show any concrete steps made by the Japanese government on this.
As a whole, we welcome the continued work of the Japanese
government on this item, and give it a B grade.
Program of Work to Establish a Subsidiary Body to Deal with Nuclear
Disarmament in the CD
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an
appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a
programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a
1: Japan should repeatedly stress the importance of an Ad Hoc Committee
on nuclear disarmament at international forums such as the UNGA and the
TASK 2: Japan should seek a mediation proposal to contribute to breaking
through the impasse in the CD, keeping an independent diplomatic
attitude as the country devastated by nuclear weapons.
TASK 3: In order to raise international public opinion on the urgency of
nuclear disarmament, Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear
weapons, should make fresh and epoch-making efforts. Convening an
ginternational conference to eliminate nuclear dangers,h proposed by
UN Secretary General Annan, could be one way of doing this.
1, 2 (Break though the CD impasse)
As stated in the previous item, the deadlock over the CD still continues, and it seems unlikely that a program of work for establishing the subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament will be agreed on in the near future. A basis for compromise may be found in the previously mentioned Amorim proposal. However, the mandate of the subsidiary body in this proposal is limited to gexchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic effort to attain this objective [of nuclear disarmament],h and the mandate to make consultations or negotiations on nuclear disarmament is not a premise. While the US has reluctantly agreed to this proposal, some positive states like New Zealand have expressed the criticism that the subsidiary body under this proposal would fall short of the one that the 2000 NPT Final Document agreed to establish.
Under such circumstances, it is important for Japan to establish its tradition of independent diplomacy, which would be consistently based upon moral principles as the country devastated by nuclear weapons.
3 (Raising international public opinion)
In order to overcome the deadlock in the CD and to achieve the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, we believe it is necessary to raise global public awareness on the urgency of nuclear disarmament. Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, has an important role to play in this respect. It would be possible for Japan to enact a Non-Nuclear Law, for example, clearly denying the utility of nuclear weapons, and to demonstrate its change of policy to the world. It would also be possible to educate the public globally on the immorality and dangers of nuclear weapons in an original manner, by letting municipalities such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki play a leading role. Another possible way would be to utilize, from such a viewpoint, the Annan proposal calling for a gmajor international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangersh which was raised at the UN Millennium Assembly and also adopted in the Millennium Declaration.
As for TASK 1, the 2001 Japanese UNGA resolution proposed a more concrete objective than that of the 2000 resolution, namely the establishment of the subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the CD gas early as possible during its 2002 session.h This can be seen as progress.
As for TASK 2, or Japanfs diplomatic attitude in the CD, as we mentioned in the previous item, the enthusiastic speech by Ambassador NOBORU at the first session of the 2002 CD should be appreciated from the viewpoint of breaking through the CD deadlock. Although the Amorim proposal is indeed a possible choice for compromise at the moment, the Japanese government should make it clear that supporting the proposal is nothing but a reluctant choice, after expressing the earnest sentiment of the country devastated by nuclear weapons. This should have been done particularly under the circumstances in which New Zealand raised an objection to the Amorim proposal, arguing that the subsidiary body described in the proposal would not fulfill the requirement of the NPT agreement.
TASK 3 is the most important task for overcoming the deadlock, but the Japanese government had shown no intention to tackle this.
As a whole, we give the GOJ a C grade on this item.
Principle of Irreversibility
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear
disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction
TASK 1: The GOJ should demand that both the US and
Russia include the issue of the irreversibility into the official agenda
of the US-Russia START process.
TASK 2: Japan should urge the US to observe the principle of irreversibility in response to the recent US tendency to ignore the principle.
TASK 3: Japan should terminate its cooperative
research with the US on TMD, which could lead to the abrogation of the
ABM Treaty and invite nuclear build ups by Russia and China.
TASK 4: In order to prevent the redeployment of
tactical nuclear weapons onto ships and aircraft, Japan should codify
its Three Non-Nuclear Principles into law.
TASK 5: Japan should make an independent examination,
which does not just follow the US statements, on the US Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP), including the National
Ignition Facility (NIF).
1 (Call for irreversibility in START)
With regard to irreversibility, the primary concerns have been with the quantitative reduction and management of nuclear warheads and weapon-usable fissile materials. At the 1997 Helsinki US-Russia Summit, there were discussions on making the irreversibility of cuts in nuclear weapons part of the agenda at the START III talks. Taking advantage of this, the Japanese government should have repeatedly called their attention to this point and made efforts to further develop the principle.
2 (Call on the US)
What is remarkable about the latest NPT agreement is that it does not limit its focus to quantitative reductions. It should be recognized as an agreement that does not allow any stepping back from or abandoning of existing measures on arms control and disarmament regarding nuclear weapons, including the moratorium on nuclear explosion tests and the UN Security Council resolution on security assurances (April 11, 1995), as well as other political declarations and resolutions.
The Bush administration has indicated that it would abrogate the ABM Treaty in pursuing missile defense; neglected to work to bring the START II into force; and indicated a policy not to support the CTBT. This attitude might affect many other states or issues to move backwards. Therefore, there was certainly a need for Japan, as a country in a close relation with the US and, moreover, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, to strongly urge the US to observe the principle of irreversibility.
3 (Termination of TMD research cooperation)
The US-Japan cooperative research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) puts irreversibility in danger in two senses. First, even if it is only research, the US-Japanese intention to develop TMD has the potential to heighten tensions in East Asia, and trigger an arms race. Thus, the cooperative research could become the cause for a reversal in Chinese nuclear policy, including a change of its no-first-use/negative security assurances policy. Second, there had been no agreement between the US and Russia on whether the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NWTD) system, the subject of the US-Japan research cooperation, violates the ABM Treaty or not. Still more, since missile defense under the Bush administration has been an integrated initiative of TMD and NMD (National Missile Defense), there is a strong likelihood that the overall scheme violates the ABM Treaty. This is why the Bush administration had been suggesting that it would choose unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US-Japan cooperative research on TMD technologies not only paves the way for the collapse of the ABM Treaty regime, but could also lead to setbacks in Russiafs nuclear weapon policies.
If it is upgraded to the development stage, as suggested in the recent US-Japan consultation on defense (February 8, 2002), it would become the biggest obstacle to promoting the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.
4 (Prevention of redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on board
In 1991, President Bush and Secretary General Gorbachev agreed to eliminate and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons as ga coordinated unilateral action.h It is especially important to assure the irreversibility of these measures. Japan, through these measures, has gained the direct benefit of liberation from the suspicion of introduction by the U.S. of nuclear weapons using ships and aircraft, at least in peacetime. It would be appropriate to legislate the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as a method to guarantee the irreversibility of these measures in a host nation of ships and aircraft.
5 (Independent examination on the SSMP)
In addition, the US Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP), whose purpose is explained as to maintain the existing stockpile, has been criticized by experts, based on scientific data, as going beyond the objectives of ensuring safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons. It goes against irreversibility to develop new nuclear weapons. Similar criticisms have been directed at the NIF.
However, the Japanese government turns its eyes away from any analysis other than the US official explanation of the SSMP. This is connected to the Japanese governmentfs attitude of not seriously examining HOYAfs cooperation with the NIF. It is urged to make an independent examination, not just following US statements.
During the relevant period of this report, there were a great number of US acts that violate the principle of irreversibility, which cannot be overlooked:
(a) Adopting a stance against the CTBT (Ari Fleischer, Spokesman for the White House, and Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the Department of State, July 9, 2001)
(b) Notification of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (December 13, 2001)
(c) Abandoning the START process (ditto, and Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002)
(d) Reducing the time to resume nuclear testing (Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002)
(e) Placing reduced warheads into the Responsive Force (ditto)
As to START in TASK 1, the START process had been unilaterally abandoned by the US ((c) above), before the Japanese government took any measures to save it. Since then, the Japanese government has taken the passive attitude of just watching the US-Russian talks on a new strategic framework.
As for TASK 2, the Japanese government had not taken even a single action suitable to the government of the country devastated by nuclear weapons, in the face of the series of serious violations by the US, from (a) to (e) above, of its commitment to the international community. This history is completely unsatisfactory and the GOJ must be blamed for this lack of action.
On TASKS 3, 4 and 5, which are concrete tasks Japan should tackle, the GOJ has exhibited no attitude that it would make efforts.
Meanwhile, it should be reaffirmed, though it is not mentioned in the above tasks, that Japan itself has a unique responsibility regarding the principles of irreversibility such as presented by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Diet resolution on the peaceful use of the space, and so forth. It would be a suicidal act against nuclear disarmament if Japan deviated from these principles.
As a whole, we cannot help but be strict and give the GOJ an E
Unequivocal Undertaking by the Nuclear-Weapon States to Accomplish the
Total Elimination of their Nuclear Arsenals
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon
States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals
leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are
committed under article VI.
TASK 1: Japan should include, within its UNGA
resolution gA Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,h
contents gcalling upon all the nuclear-weapon States to formulate
plans of action for the implementation of their unequivocal undertaking
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.h
TASK 2: Japan itself should formulate a plan of action
to completely eliminate its dependence on nuclear weapons.
TASK 3: Japan should oppose subcritical tests.
1 (Call for plans of action)
This item can be called a treasure to be utilized as a key for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear-weapon States have not made any concrete efforts to fulfill their gunequivocal undertaking,h since the 2000 NPT Final Document was agreed. On the contrary, in the US presidential election in the fall of 2000, neither of the candidates specifically mentioned this gunequivocal undertaking.h Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, at the discussions in the CD that year, the nuclear-weapon States failed to show any improvement in their attitude. Under such circumstances, at the UNGA in the fall 2000, it was significant that the New Agenda countries submitted a draft resolution to reaffirm the Final Document, and that Japan submitted a new draft resolution based upon the same Document. In particular, the Japanese resolution, entitled gA Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,h had a title that implied a plan of action for the implementation of the gunequivocal undertaking,h and the high motivation of the sponsor, the Japanese government, should be highly praised.
The GOJ is urged to attach great importance to the gunequivocal undertakingh in future Path Resolutions, and to repeat concrete attempts to push the nuclear-weapon States, through the resolutions, towards the implementation of the gunequivocal undertaking.h Repeating the contents of the 2000 resolution in future resolutions would be insufficient, since the 2000 resolution ended up being no more than a list of individual interim measures, and was thus not a comprehensive plan aimed to totally abolish nuclear weapons: The contents did not live up to the title.
A possible step to take would be to demand that the nuclear-weapon States formulate gplans of action for the implementation of the total elimination,h as a next step since they have already committed themselves to the gunequivocal undertaking.h The Plans of action could be different for each nuclear-weapon State, and therefore it would be realistic to include, in the draft text of the Path Resolution, contents that only request them to formulate and submit plans of actions for the implementation of the gunequivocal undertaking.h
2 (Total elimination of dependence on nuclear weapons)
The task of achieving the total elimination of nuclear arsenals deals not only with the nuclear-weapon States themselves, but also with states such as the NATO members, Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), which are dependent on nuclear weapons in their security policies. Since the gunequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenalsh was made, this means that the nuclear-dependent States also made an gunequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their dependence on nuclear weapons.h Therefore, the nuclear-dependent States are urged to formulate gplans of action for the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking.h Among them, Japan should play a leading role.
3 (Opposition to subcritical tests)
The minimum obligation imposed by the gunequivocal undertakingh is not to increase the number of nuclear weapons from the present number. From the viewpoint of Japan calling for the speedy implementation, it should call for an end to the subcritical tests being conducted by the US and Russia. Even granting that these subcritical tests are gto ensure the safety and reliability of existing stockpiles,h they still remain means to prolong the life of nuclear weapons. Many nuclear weapon-free municipalities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cities, have opposed and protested subcritical tests by any states, but the Japanese government has admitted them. It can be fairly inferred that Japan cannot raise an objection against the subcritical tests, which the US claims to be essential, substantially because Japan maintains the policy of depending on US nuclear deterrence. Japan should change its policy of admitting subcritical tests in order to implement its own gunequivocal undertaking.h
The Japanese government adopted strange behavior in the text of the 2001 draft Path Resolution, which can be interpreted as having an intention to discard the gains of the gunequivocal undertaking.h
The fair and natural course of logic goes as follows: The gunequivocal undertakingh has already been made, and the next steps should be called for on the premise of the undertaking. Along this course, Japan put the words of the gunequivocal undertakingh into the preamble and welcomed it in the 2000 Path Resolution. The New Agenda took a similar stance as well.
However, in the 2001 Path Resolution, the GOJ put part of the gunequivocal undertakingh into one of the operative paragraphs; in other words, it downgraded the gunequivocal undertakingh into one among a series of steps to be taken in the future. In response to the strong criticism by the New Agenda countries on this, Japan made an amendment to add the modifier of gas agreed in the 2000 NPT Review Conferenceh to the gunequivocal undertaking,h but did not amend the place where it was put. That was one of the major reasons why the New Agenda countries abstained from voting for the 2001 Path Resolution.
It is still not clear what awareness the GOJ had of the important implication the change of the structure of its draft resolution would present. It is known that there was influence from the French government during the drafting period.
In any case, regarding the Japanese governmentfs records on TASK 1 during the relevant period, the GOJ has committed the fault of confusing the context for the gunequivocal undertaking,h not to mention the call for gplans of action.h
In addition, the MOFA presented to Peace Depot its view that the ongoing US-Russian strategic arms reduction is evidence that the gunequivocal undertakingh is actually being implemented. However, though the reduction itself should certainly be welcomed, the MOFA has turned its eyes away from the point that the reduction is being pursued in the context of preserving nuclear forces for an indefinite period, as described in the NPR (January 9, 2002).
As for TASK 2, there has been no sign that the Japanese government recognizes that the gunequivocal undertakingh is a task related to Japan itself, and thus no efforts have been made.
As for the subcritical tests of TASK 3, five such tests were conducted by the US alone (Oboe 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), once jointly by the US and the UK (Vito), and at least five by Russia, but the Japanese government has maintained the position of admitting them. It is also notable that Prime Minister Junichiro KOIZUMI stated, in front of reporters, gthis is not a matter that needs any particular comment onh in a gso-whath attitude on 14th February 2002, the day of the US and UK joint test. This also revealed the governmentfs indifference to the issue. It must reflect the Japanese leadersf indifference to the gunequivocal undertakingh itself.
The policies of the Japanese government on this important item
run seriously counter to the expectations that were placed, from both
inside and outside, on Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear
weapons. As a whole, we give it an E grade.
Preservation and Strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the Promotion of
the START Process
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the
conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and
strengthening the Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System
as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further
reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its
TASK 1: Japan should continue to submit resolutions to the UNGA calling
for the gpreservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty, the early
entry into force of START II, and the early conclusion of START III.h
TASK 2: Japan should criticize the Bush administrationfs initiative on
missile defense, and express the intention to suspend temporarily, at
least, cooperative research on TMD, as an emergency measure to stop the
Bush administrationfs move toward withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
TASK 3: With regard to unilateral nuclear arms reductions by the US and
Russia, the GOJ should demand that they be codified into treaty regimes
to ensure verifiability and irreversibility.
TASK 4: The GOJ should promote work for a new treaty, either inside or
outside the CD, to prevent a war in space.
1, 2 (Promotion of the START process)
In his speech of May 1, 2001, George W. Bush declared the abrogation, albeit not unilaterally, of the ABM Treaty, and the construction of a worldwide missile defense shield, and also announced deep cuts in nuclear weapons without touching upon the START process. At a result of this, this item of the 2000 NPT agreement was brought into crisis. At the June 2000 US-Russian Summit in Ljubljana, Slovenia, it was made clear that all negotiations would start afresh, and after the talks, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that his country would conceivably abrogate the ABM Treaty unilaterally. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded by saying that Russia might respond to this by strengthening its nuclear arsenal. This showed a possible serious future juncture regarding their fundamental positions on the ABM Treaty.
It is also clear that the expected abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the US is closely linked to the missile defense plan. Therefore, the USfs unilateral pursuit of missile defense would be an unacceptable policy from the viewpoint of preserving the START process.
For the Japanese government, giving great importance to the START process has consistently been one of the central pillars of its nuclear disarmament policy. There has been some cynical analysis that the GOJ just mirrors the US in promoting START. No matter whether this view is fair or not, Japan has of course been urged to take measures to preserve and strengthen the ABM regime in order to keep the consistency of its policy. The text of the 2000 Path Resolution incorporated just the same words on this item from the NPT Final Document.
Therefore, under the circumstances in which the START process has fallen into a crisis, the Japanese government should have checked the US moves towards withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and made efforts to prevent it. Unless a more effective process for the elimination of nuclear weapons than the START process is assured, it is necessary for the Japanese government, as the minimum expression of its intention, to continue to call for the gpreservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the promotion of the START processh in its UNGA resolutions.
On the other hand, it would be an appropriate measure to decide to suspend at least temporarily the US-Japan research cooperation on TMD technologies, as a criticism of the overall missile defense system pursued by the Bush administration, and arguing that the said TMD might constitute a part of the system and thus have a harmful influence on the nuclear disarmament process.
TASK 3 (Verifiability and irreversibility of the US-Russian
With regard to the direction for deep cuts in nuclear warheads, it can be said that the US and Russia are in agreement, but there too a major problem has arisen. US unilateralism, which makes light of international frameworks based on multilateral consultations, as exemplified by its unilateral refusal of the Kyoto Protocol to cope with global warming and its expression not to support the CTBT, has shown itself here all too well. It was foreseeable that if the US ignored the NPT (13+2) steps, the path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons would be battered by self-centered US policies.
Even if we welcome the deep cuts in nuclear warheads themselves, they must lead the two countries to fulfill the gunequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals.h For this purpose, they must be incorporated into a treaty framework, and there must be guarantees, with verification of transparency and irreversibility.
4 (New Outer Space Treaty)
It also appears that the Bush administrationfs missile defense initiative opens the door to a new dimension of arms expansion, which is the deployment of weapons in outer space. This was shown in the speech of President Bush on May 1, 2001, where he specifically mentioned the effectiveness of the boost phase interception of missiles. Expanding weapons deployment into the dimension of outer space would be a seriously harmful action running against peace for humanity in the 21st century. An arms build-up in space would bring about competition for military supremacy, which would run counter to global public opinion calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
In order to stop this tendency, NGOs made a proposal for a new treaty to prevent wars in space, complementing the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. This new outer space treaty could act as an effective brake against the Bush administrationfs policies. Considering the impasse in the CD, it might be effective to negotiate the new treaty outside the CD, at the initiative of like-minded states. Japan is also urged to work positively in this field.
As for TASK 1, though Japan was urged to make serious efforts to save the START process, it anticipated the US governmentfs trend and made an orbital adjustment even before October 18, 2001, the deadline of submission of draft resolutions for the 2001 UNGA. At that time, the US-Russia agreement on nuclear arms cuts (Bush-Putin meeting, November 13-14, 2001) had not been made, nor had the US notification of unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (December 13, 2001). But the submitted draft Path Resolution already set START in the past, and deleted even the names of ABM and START from the future tasks. This attitude displayed, to the international community, the subordination of Japanfs nuclear disarmament diplomacy to the US. It seriously disappointed Japanese citizens who somehow put their hopes on Japanfs independence.
Under these circumstances, there has not been a single action taken by the GOJ to respond to TASK 2.
On December 13, 2001, the US unilaterally notified to the other States parties, that is Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, that the US would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This brought about a remarkable change in the international environment regarding this 7th item. The US can be said to have trampled the 2000 NPT agreement openly. Furthermore, the constitutional legitimacy of the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has been continuously disputed inside the US. Therefore, the international community faces two problems: One is to put into question the US violation of the NPT agreement and President Bushfs policy tendencies. The other is, on this occasion, to start working for the establishment of a more speedy nuclear disarmament process than the ABM/START regime.
TASK 3 is becoming more important considering this second point The NPR, the foreword of which was released at the beginning of 2002, made it clear that the US will pursue arms reductions without any treaty codification and will continue to depend on nuclear weapons into the far distant future. The Japanese government only emphasizes the words gdeep cuts,h and is not willing to allow an independent examination of this. Furthermore, it has not shown any efforts to get Japanfs requests reflected in the US-Russian talks, just keeping its position gto maintain a calm watch on the US-Russian talks.h
As for TASK 4, no sense of crisis is found in the Japanese governmentfs official position on missile defense, which reads: gThe GOJ expresses the understanding that the US is considering the missile defense program while making various diplomatic efforts to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles.h Looking back, the Japanese government has not paid adequate attention to the criticism that the TMD, whose technologies Japan started to research cooperatively with the US, violates the Japanese Diet Resolution that states gthe purposes of the objects launched into outer space should be limited to peaceful uses (May 9, 1969).h We want to find some hope in the fact that the GOJ has given minimum support for the Amorim proposal and promoted the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the PAROS (prevention of arms race in outer space) at the CD. However, we should also note that the Amorim proposal does not give any treaty-negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committees.
As a whole, Japanfs negative attitude on this important task is
quite disappointing, and we give it an E grade.
Completion and Implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the
US, Russia and the IAEA
The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between
the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
1: Japan should give positive support to the Trilateral Initiative.
1 (Support of the Trilateral Initiative)
With regard to the excess fissile materials that emerged as a result of nuclear arms reductions by the US and Russia, a Trilateral Initiative was launched in 1996, under which they would work with the IAEA to ensure that these materials were not used for weapons purposes again. If this system is fully established, it could be used for other nuclear-weapon States, and thus it has deep significance for the total elimination of nuclear weapons under article VI of the NPT.
In addition, this initiative, which was originally related to the START process, should have been observed with an updated interest during the relevant period of this report, when the START process fell into crisis.
As for TASK 1, the Japanese Path Resolution did not mention the Trilateral Initiative in particular. This should be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese government did not oppose the initiative, but regarded its contents as being included in the 10th item of the 13 steps, which calls on all the nuclear-weapon States for similar efforts. However, as we wrote before, now that the START process between the US and Russia is being replaced by unilateral reduction processes, it can be said that the necessity to grasp the Trilateral Initiative in an alternative context is increasing.
To this extent, Japan did not tackle this item sufficiently, and
we give it a D grade.
Stabilityh and the gPrinciple of Undiminished Security for Allh
Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in
a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle
of undiminished security for all:
TASK 1: The GOJ should not use, and not let others use, the gpromotion
of international stabilityh or the gprinciple of undiminished
security for allh as reasons for delaying the implementation of the
1 (Preventing misuse)
The 9th item contains six steps to be taken, 9a to 9f, but they are covered by an overall chapeau including ginternational securityh and the gprinciple of undiminished security for all.h In the negotiation process, the nuclear-weapon States favored the phrase gstrategic stabilityh as a chapeau to cover the 9th item, but the New Agenda countries and others found this to be a recognition of the nuclear weapons balance, and insisted on the wording ginternational stability.h
In the same way, nuclear deterrence and the balance of power can be used as a basis for opposing nuclear disarmament, through the gprinciple of undiminished security for all.h For example, there are arguments, within the Japanese government, that gthe US policy of first-use of nuclear weapons is a necessary deterrent against threat posed by the DPRK.h This is one example of a government resisting steps towards nuclear disarmament with the excuse that those steps might diminish the statefs security.
Rather, ginternational stabilityh and gundiminished security for allh should be argued in such a way that they will be created and maintained through the promotion of nuclear disarmament by taking steps as nuclear arms reduction, lowered alert status, enhanced accountability for nuclear weapons, the reduction of dependence on nuclear weapons by means such such as no-first-use, confidence building, and the promotion of compliance with existing agreements.
During the relevant period, there were no instance where TASK 1 became the direct point of issue in relation to the implementation of items 9a to 9f. However, the US action of openly violating the 7th item (the ABM Treaty/START) and replacing START with unilateral cuts was an alarm for the implementation of the steps such as (9a) unilateral cuts and (9b) transparency. As described before in our report on the 7th item, the GOJ did not cope with it properly.
We give a D grade to Japanfs efforts on this item.
Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals
9a. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear
TASK 1: The GOJ should call upon the US and Russia to codify their
unilateral cuts into a treaty framework to guarantee verifiability and
TASK 2: The GOJ should make an independent examination and speak out on
questions such as the relation between the unilateral cuts and total
elimination, the speed of the cuts, issues other than strategic arms
reduction, and unilateral cuts by nuclear-weapon States other than the
US and Russia.
1 (Verifiability and Irreversibility of the US-Russian cuts)
During the relevant period of the report since President Bushfs speech on May 1, 2001, the unilateral cuts in strategic nuclear weapons by the US and Russia have been a global concern. Unilateral cuts should be greatly welcomed. However, their verifiability and irreversibility must be pursued. In this regard, TASK 3 on the 7th item should become a focus again.
2 (Relation to the total elimination, speed of cuts, etc)
In addition, unilateral cuts must not be accompanied by the intention to perpetuate nuclear weapons. Careful examination should be given to whether the expected deep cut proposals by the US and Russia are being made in the context of a speedy fulfillment of the Article VI obligation of the NPT and other NPT agreements including gthe unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination.h
Furthermore, we should pay attention to the speed of the unilateral cuts. The START III reduction, down to 2,000-2,500 each, was aimed to be accomplished by 2007, according to the Helsinki agreement between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin (March 21, 1997), and this provides a criterion.
The unilateral measures that may be taken are not limited to strategic reductions. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are the nuclear weapons that are most likely to be used, and thus their unilateral reduction is important in the context of regional security. This will be further analyzed in item 9c.
Moreover, the US and Russia could take unilateral measures such as the relaxation of the alert status of nuclear forces, and the early retirement of warheads to be reduced under START I and START II.
The UK, France and China, by taking unilateral measures, should also contribute to the promotion of nuclear disarmament. In particular, China is the only nuclear weapon States that has not yet announced such measures, and it would be desirable for it to make new efforts in this area.
The GOJ should make an independent examination and analysis, and then express its views in a timely manner.
As for TASK 1, as already analyzed in the 5th and 7th items, the efforts by the Japanese government were not sufficient at all.
In relation to TASK 2, there is very little information to show the GOJfs views on the US-Russian gdeep cuts,h after the US announcement of its Nuclear Posture Review. But the GOJ continues its basic attitude of praising the gdeep cutsh as a great progress, as previously mentioned, while saying sufficient considerations are yet to be made.
Actually, despite the term gdeep cuts,h the targeted number of warheads is the same as the number which Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to (it appears to be 300 lower, but this is simply because of differences in the ways of counting), and in addition, the speed of the reduction was made slower, for the deadline of the reduction, which was gby 2007h in the Clinton-Yeltsin agreement, is now gby 2012.h
Furthermore, the US has come up with the New Triad, in which it advances a new deterrence based on both of missile defense and offensive nuclear forces, and moreover, the concept of the Responsive Forces has been introduced to store a substantial part of the reduced warheads for potential future use. We have to say that this is a make-believe nuclear reduction, not the genuine elimination of nuclear weapons. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a highly respected NGO of experts in the US, severely criticized the contents of the NPR, saying gFaking Nuclear Restrainth and gNuclear Weapons Forever?h
The GOJ is urged to expedite its objective evaluation of the NPR in order to avoid giving its people a misleading impression.
We give a D grade to the efforts by the GOJ on this issue.
9b. Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to
the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements
pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to
support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
TASK 1: The GOJ should promote the formulation of an inventory and
reporting system regarding nuclear weapons, relevant nuclear materials,
and their delivery systems, both on the global and Asia-Pacific regional
TASK 2: Japan should call upon the US to abandon the policy of gneither
confirm nor deny (NCND).h
1 (Formulation of an inventory)
Increasing transparency regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear materials is a task both for the world as a whole and for this region.
The most fundamental task on the global scale is to require all states concerned to give annual reports with full records of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon usable materials, as well as their delivery systems. Not only will such data be necessary when trying to achieve the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, but will form the foundation of confidence-building in the process toward the goal. It would be desirable to require that the data be submitted as reports to the NPT Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committees. One way to do this would be for the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs to provide a type of standardized report.
In order to promote the confidence building and disarmament necessary for peace in Northeast Asia, it is vital to increase transparency regarding the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons in the region. The Japanese government should make efforts to increase transparency regarding the nuclear arsenals of China, the Russian Pacific region and the US Pacific region, as well as their delivery systems. This task will be essential for any project to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia.
TASK 2 (Call to abandon the NCND policy)
The US policy of gneither confirm nor denyh (NCND) has been a major obstacle for increasing transparency. Actually, suspicions among Japanese citizens that nuclear weapons are being introduced into Japan on US ships and aircraft has not yet been eliminated due to the NCND policy. It is the GOJfs concrete task related to this item to demand a change of the US NCND policy.
As for TASK 1, no such efforts seem to have been made by the GOJ, and it does not seem to have any intention to do so. This is a basic task, and we urge future efforts.
As for TASK 2, there were many cases in the relevant period where municipalities could not persuade their citizens to accept the GOJfs explanation of why it believes in the non-existence of nuclear weapons aboard the US ships. Examples of such cases were aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawkfs visit to Otaru, Hokkaido (October 13, 2000), the 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridgefs attempt to visit Tomakomai, Hokkaido (February 7, 2001), which was abandoned, and the Aegis cruiser USS Vincennesf visit to Himeji, Hyogo (August 28, 2001). These constitute evidence that the lack of transparency resulting from the US NCND policy has stirred Japanese citizensf sense of insecurity. Moreover, considering the responses by China and the DPRK, that are on alert against US military forces, the NCND policy is definitely raising tension in this region. However, the Japanese government has never requested the US to change its NCND policy.
As a whole, we give a D grade to the GOJfs efforts on this
in Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
9c. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on
unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms
reduction and disarmament process.
TASK 1: The GOJ should place emphasis on the reduction and increased
transparency of non-strategic nuclear arms as one of its major focuses
of nuclear disarmament.
TASK 2: The GOJ should support the call on the US to withdraw its nuclear
weapons deployed in NATO countries.
TASK 3: The GOJ should call on the US for unilateral cuts in nuclear
cruise missiles, and call on China for unilateral cuts in tactical
TASK 4: The GOJ should call on the US to abandon its NCND policy.
1 (Focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons)
Within the new strategic environment, there are concerns that both the US and Russia will increase their dependence on non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is, in fact, tactical nuclear weapons that are most likely to be actually used. Consequently, it is vitally important to place an emphasis on non-strategic nuclear arms reduction.
There are variety of problems in this area, including the USfs deployment of nuclear bombs in NATO countries, NATOfs sub-strategic nuclear weapons including those deployed by the UK and France, the possible redeployment by Russia of tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, which became an issue in January 2001 (but with Russia denied), Russiafs new doctrine of increasing dependence on tactical nuclear weapons (which is acting as an impediment to the efforts to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia), and the suspected presence of nuclear weapons aboard US submarines caused by continued launch tests of nuclear cruise missiles and the US policy of NCND. The GOJ should mindfully make efforts toward the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Up to now, cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons have all been done through unilateral initiatives, with no verification or reporting taking place through treaties. In this regard, it is of particular importance to impart transparency and legal bindingness to the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev initiative on the dismantlement, removal and reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. It has been reported that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons was to be discussed at the START III talks, but there is also a need to search for a path towards an agreement focusing specifically on tactical nuclear weapons, since even the collapse of the START process is anticipated.
2 (Removal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in NATO)
The nuclear weapons deployed in NATO by the US unique in being the only nuclear weapons in the world that are deployed on soil outside the nuclear weapon States. They may constitute a destructive precedent that could lead other nuclear weapon States, and especially Russia, to deploy their tactical nuclear weapons on soil outside their territories. Global public opinion calling for their withdrawal should be raised.
3 (Call for abandoning the NCND policy)
The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is of particular importance to the Japanese government in terms of easing regional tensions and advancing regional security in East Asia. It would be a beneficial way toward the easing of tensions and the denuclearization of the region for Japan to call for a reduction in US nuclear cruise missiles, since they could be brought into Japanese ports aboard US attack nuclear powered submarines in emergency situations. While pursuing such efforts, it would be effective to call upon China for a reduction in its tactical nuclear weapons. At that time, the need for the US to abandon its NCND policy should be addressed again to ensure transparency.
As for TASK 1, though the GOJ has expressed its interest in addressing the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons, it actually has done nothing concrete.
With regard to TASK 2, the GOJ has not expressed any position. This is just one example of how the GOJ does not speak from a global perspective, which is a mandatory task for a government of the country devastated by nuclear weapons.
As for TASKS 3 and 4, though these are issues that are very much associated with Japan, there have been no efforts by the GOJ.
As a whole, we give the GOJ a D grade on this item.
9d. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of
nuclear weapons systems.
TASK 1: The GOJ should emphasize the de-alerting of all strategic nuclear
1 (Call for de-alerting)
It was the hair trigger alert status, which was maintained for strategic nuclear weapons, that was most controversial in the negotiations on this item at the NPT Review Conference. Given that in his May 1, 2001, speech, President Bush said, gTodayfs Russia is not our enemy,h and emphasized that this was no longer the Cold War era, there is no reason for such a high alert status to be continued. Moreover, the maintenance of hair trigger alert inevitably increases the risk of accidental launches of nuclear missiles. We should start from the common sense that ga world with nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert is not a sane world.h
In addition, the triad of strategic nuclear weapons (ICBMs, SLBMs and Strategic Bombers), which is based upon the same ideology of extreme distrust of the Cold War era, is still maintained. The US, Russia and China should abandon the idea of the strategic triad, and reduce the number of legs of their strategic nuclear weapons, following the examples of France and the UK,
As for TASK 1, The GOJ has expressed its concern about de-alerting. The MOFA has stated that it has been considering what to do to address this issue. Yet nothing concrete has been proposed thus far.
Following his May 1 statement, President Bush stated again that
the hostile relationship of the Cold War era between the US and Russia
had disappeared. He said this in his speech to declare the U.S.fs
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001. He stated, gNeither
does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of
nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other.h It is
not generally believed that this statement meant that the US had
actually de-alerted. However, it is at least an unintended logical
confession by President Bush that the hair trigger alert was outdated.
Future developments on this issue should be closely watched.
We must wait for further information on how the US Nuclear
Posture Review, which was submitted to Congress in early 2002, addresses
the issue of de-alerting.
Though the GOJ has some interest in the issue of de-alerting, it
has made no concrete efforts, so we give it a D grade.
Diminishing Role for Nuclear Weapons in Security Policies
9e. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies
to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to
facilitate the process of their total elimination.
TASK 1: By 2005, Japan should eliminate dependence on nuclear weapons
from its national security policy. It should formulate an action plan to
TASK 2: Japan should, as soon as possible, issue a political declaration
to work for establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.
TASK 3: Japan should grow out of its policy of dependence on nuclear
deterrence in the review process of its National Defense Program
TASK 4: Japan should aim to enact its own gNon-Nuclear Law.h
1 (Action Plan to eliminate Japanfs dependence on nuclear weapons)
This item has as much to do with the nuclear-dependent States such as Japan as it does with the nuclear weapon States. In order to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is also necessary that the nuclear dependent States reduce their dependence. With regard to Japan, in spite of the fact that it should appeal most strongly for the immorality of nuclear weapons as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, it has adopted a national security policy that relies on nuclear weapons. As long as the GOJ continues to depend on US nuclear deterrence, all of Japanfs nuclear policies will remain within the permissible range of the US policy. The GOJfs calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons will be considered to be mere performances, deceiving its people, if they can only be made on the palm of the US government. Therefore, the GOJ should set the goal of changing its security policy to one independent of nuclear weapons by the time of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and formulate an action plan for that goal. By doing so, it will be able to make a major contribution to the implementation of article VI of the NPT.
2 (A political declaration for the establishment of a Northeast Asia
The GOJfs rationale for the need to rely on US nuclear weapons would become almost totally irrelevant through the establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Japan should, as soon as possible, express a policy direction toward establishing a NWFZ in a political declaration. We believe that the issuance of such a political declaration would by itself have a positive effect in relaxing tensions and promoting mutual trust in the region.
TASK 3 (Revision of the National Defense Program Outline)
In August 2001, it was reported that the Japanese government was planning to review and revise its 1995 National Defense Program Outline. The government should take advantage of this opportunity to review its nuclear-dependency policy. The only basic policy document that defines the dependence on the US nuclear weapons in Japanfs security policy is the 1995 National Defense Program Outline. Based on this Outline, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation also specify Japanfs dependence on US nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the deletion of the clause defining dependence on nuclear deterrence from the National Defense Program Outline in its review process would be a concrete and essential first task for Japanfs implementation of the NPT agreements.
More concretely, this should be considered based on the following background: The previous National Defense Program Outline, which was issued in 1976, read gAgainst the threat of nuclear weapons, (Japan) relies on the US nuclear deterrent.h Now, the present 1995 Outline reads gAgainst the threat of nuclear weapons, (Japan) relies on the US nuclear deterrent, while working actively on international efforts for realistic and steady nuclear disarmament aiming at a world free from nuclear weapons.h One can recognize that certain progress was made from 1976 to 1995.
Therefore, the next Outline, which will be made through a revision at a time when the nuclear-weapon States have made gan unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals,h should read, for example, as follows:
gAgainst the threat of nuclear weapons, while working actively on international efforts for the implementation of ean unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals,f which was agreed to in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Japan should speedily grow out of its dependence on the US nuclear deterrent.h
TASK 4 (Legislation of a Non-Nuclear Law)
Furthermore, in order to establish Japanfs non-nuclear status,
ensured by a verification system, the GOJ should enact a Non-Nuclear
Law, including the legislation of the three Non-Nuclear Principles. By
doing this, Japan could set a perfect example for its neighboring states
that it has fulfilled the step of gdiminishing the role of nuclear
weapons in security policy.h It could contribute to the entire NPT
regime, and thus strengthen its moral position as the country devastated
by nuclear weapons, to increase its influence on nuclear disarmament
With regard to TASKS
1, 2, 3 and 4,
the Japanese government barely seems to recognize that the
gdiminishing role of nuclear weaponsh is a task set forth upon Japan
Progress toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons would be
made only when the nuclear-dependent States change their thought and
policy into ones in which they believe that their national security can
be ensured without relying on nuclear weapons. If Japan continues to
request a US nuclear umbrella for its defense, then the very same logic
would allow India, Pakistan and a few more new states to go nuclear.
We cannot say which is better, to ghaveh or to glet others
have and use.h Both are obstacles to the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. This point is essential for Japan, and we urge the GOJ to
reflect seriously as it has shown no sign toward a change of its present
As a whole, since we are gravely concerned about the continuation
of the nuclear weapon
dependent security policy by Japan, a country devastated by such
weapons, we give it an E grade.
The Engagement of All Nuclear-Weapon States in a Process Leading to the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
9f. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the
nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of
their nuclear weapons.
TASK 1: The GOJ should make efforts to realize, as
soon as possible, a conference on nuclear disarmament by all the
nuclear-weapon States, through means such as prior technical meetings in
preparation for a
verification system, or meetings with priority on non-strategic nuclear
1 (Efforts to convene a five state conference)
There is a need to expand negotiations on nuclear arms reductions, which are currently carried out only bilaterally between the US and Russia, to all of the five nuclear-weapon States. China, the UK and France have suggested that they would not participate in a conference of this type until the US and Russia have cut their arsenals down to levels similar to theirs. India and Pakistan, from the perspectives of the Non-Aligned Movement, say that multilateral discussions in the CD are desirable. Israelfs stance is unclear.
Some possibilities could include holding a five state meeting limited to cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons, or a preparatory meeting by the five states for a verification system prior to talks on arms reduction.
Japan failed to propose a paragraph calling for a nuclear disarmament process engaging the five nuclear-weapon States in its UNGA resolutions of so-called gUltimate Eliminationh up to 1999. It appears that Japan had the intention to include such a paragraph, but US opposition blocked it. However, Japan included such content clearly in the 2000 Path Resolution, based on the 2000 NPT agreement on the thirteen steps, and continued the inclusion in the 2001 resolution.
Despite this, there have not been any active efforts so far by the GOJ, as we set for TASK 1 above. We should keep our eyes on the future behavior of the GOJ in the face of the Bush administration, which is avoiding multilateral conferences as much as possible.
Since there have not been any concrete efforts on the task, we
give the GOJ a D grade.
Placement of Excess Fissile Material under International Control and Its
Use for Peaceful Purposes
Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as
practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer
required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant
international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such
material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains
permanently outside military programmes.
1: Japan should provide positive cooperation toward a verifiable system
to place weapon-usable fissile materials outside military programs.
Public debates should be held carefully within Japan on how to do this.
1 (Cooperation and public debates)
Under the NPT regime, the step of gdisposition for peaceful purposeh of fissile materials is interpreted as progress. However, there are strong objections to this among NGOs.
The issue of the Trilateral Initiative among the US, Russia and the IAEA has been discussed in item 8. In order to prevent reduced nuclear weapons and excess fissile materials from being reused for weapons or from being illicitly transferred to others, there is a need to place them under some form of international verification system.
In order to promote this process, it will be necessary for technical and financial cooperation to be provided by Japan and other states. The US and Russia have agreed to burn fissile materials in nuclear power plants and to not reprocess them later, or to store them in mixed forms with high-level radioactive wastes, but a full discussion will be needed if Japan is to cooperate with this.
As for TASK 1, since then-Foreign Minister Masahiko KOMURAfs visit to Russia in May 1999, the gJapan-Russian Federation Joint Program for Disarmament and Environmental Protection,h a cooperation program of research and development including assistance for the disposition of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons, has been pursued. Additionally, in September 4, 2000, a Japan-Russian gMemorandum on Understandingh for assistance toward the elimination of nuclear weapons was agreed to in Tokyo. Through these, the intention been stated to expedite the disposition process of excess weapon-grade plutonium in Russia by burning MOX fuel in the Russian BN 600 fast breeder reactor.
There is insufficient information on how to evaluate this initiative. We have to give attention to the point, at the very least, that arguments for the MOX disposition of weapon-grade plutonium should not be extended to justify the MOX initiative in Japan. With regard to the issue of excess plutonium in Japan, halting reprocessing to separate plutonium should be set forth as the premise for solving the question.
Though some efforts have been made, public debate has not been
sufficient, and we give the GOJ a D grade.
and Complete Disarmament as the Ultimate Objective
Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in
the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under
effective international control.
TASK 1: The GOJ should propose in good faith a plan to establish a
Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone, and seek a path for dialogues,
in the process of talks for that purpose, on cooperative regional
security, including issues such as other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
1 (Proposal for a Northeast Asia NWFZ)
For a long time, there have been discussions on the interpretation of article VI of the NPT, which allows nuclear disarmament to be subordinated to a treaty for ggeneral and complete disarmament.h Such interpretations often had the intention of regarding the abolition of nuclear weapons as a task for the distant future. In setting the thirteen steps to implement article VI, the New Agenda countries clarified that the obligation to negotiate in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the responsibility to carry out negotiations in good faith toward a treaty for ggeneral and complete disarmament,h were related, but to be pursued separately. In the background of this was the 1996 Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled clearly that there exists an obligation to accomplish negotiations for nuclear disarmament under Article VI.
Here, it is necessary to reaffirm the fact that although nuclear disarmament should be given priority, it is in fact only one part of international security efforts. In particular, increasing the credibility and strengthening existing treaty frameworks on other WMDs – i.e. the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) – can contribute greatly to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Looking at Northeast Asia, it is important to improve the current situation where the DPRK is not a State party to the CWC. Also, there is a need for fair and levelheaded discussions with regard to delivery systems of WMDs. For example, it is not justified for Japan to unilaterally demand that the DPRK abandon its missile development program, when US naval ships are home-ported in Japan with the capability of launching 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles in all. Moreover, there is an urgent need to formulate a protocol to strengthen the verifiability of the BWC, and all the State parties need to be involved in strengthening the process.
In the Northeast Asian region, if a proposal were made to establish a NWFZ, it would be possible to incorporate discussions on WMDs other than nuclear weapons into the talks.
As for TASK 1, the Japanese government continuously emphasizes the threat of the DPRKfs WMDs and missiles, as well as that posed by Chinese nuclear weapons. It calls upon its people to counter those threats by taking military counter measures such as missile defense or the using US nuclear umbrella.
However, this item in the NPT 13 steps reaffirms the particular importance of the elimination of the threats by strengthening arms control and disarmament treaties. Based on this idea, the GOJ should make efforts to improve the security environment in the region through arms control and disarmament treaties that actively engage the very states considered threats to Japan.
However, the GOJ has hardly made any efforts in this area. This should be criticized as a major weakness of Japanfs diplomacy in Asia. On the contrary, in fact, Japan moved rapidly to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and to send Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) ships to conflict areas in support of US forces. This has been extremely harmful to the regional environment in view of cooperative security in East Asia.
Therefore, we give it an E grade on this item.
Reports on the Implementation of the Obligation of Nuclear Disarmament
Recalling the ICJfs Advisory Opinion.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review
process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the
implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on
gPrinciples and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmamenth, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
TASK 1: The GOJ should propose a standard format for regular reports on
the implementation of the NPT disarmament obligation, including the
implementation of the thirteen steps.
TASK 2: The GOJ should propose that the NPT Review PrepComs and the NPT
Review Conferences be used as opportunities for submitting and
explaining regular reports.
TASK 3: Japan should formulate and implement a regular report of its own
form through an expert panel including Japanese NGOs.
TASK 4: The GOJ should submit both its own regular reports and those made
according to the international forms to the Diet.
1 (Proposal for a standard format)
This obligation is given to all States parties. It is particularly important for the nuclear weapon States as well as the nuclear dependent States, including Japan. The thirteen steps discussed in this Report Card are related to the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on gPrinciples and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,h which is the same statement attached to this item. Therefore, the obligatory regular reports stated in it should address each of the thirteen steps. In order to ensure this, and to make sure that the reports contain necessary data such as types and numbers of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, it would be desirable to formulate a standardized form for regular reports.
TASK 2 (Reports at each of NPT PrepComs)
Furthermore, although there is no written agreement on the frequency of reports, it is desirable that at least the nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-dependent States submit reports and explain them at each NPT conference including the PrepComs starting with the 2002 PrepCom, in order to ensure that the PrepComs are substantial as they were originally intended to be.
3, 4 (Japanfs own regular reports)
Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, has a particular responsibility to faithfully fulfill this obligation. In addition, it may have its own action plan for ending its dependence on nuclear weapons in its security policy. It is also urged to have dialogues, through such regular reports, with the public that is calling strongly for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Consequently, Japan needs its own form for reports in addition to that based on international standards.
The format and system proper to Japan could be formulated through discussions in an expert panel that includes NGOs. This Report Card could be a reference for such an attempt. The contents of these reports should, as a matter of course, be submitted regularly for debate in the Diet.
Though TASKS 1, 2, 3 and 4 can all be regarded as concrete and effective proposals to utilize the NPT conferences as opportunities to provide a rhythm to the nuclear disarmament process, the Japanese government has made no concrete efforts on this thus far. We hope that it will make future efforts.
As a whole, we give a D grade to the efforts made during the
Further Development of Verification Capabilities
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that
will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear
disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear
TASK 1: The GOJ should encourage the idea that the resources now used for
nuclear weapon development, maintenance, and management should be
diverted to the development of a verification system for a gnuclear
TASK 2: The GOJ should make research and development efforts for a
regional verification system in East Asia.
TASK 3: The GOJ should consider establishing an expert panel in Japan to
closely study potential problems in verification to maintain a
gnuclear weapon-free worldh and to identify areas to be further
1 (Diversion of resources)
It is wonderful to make preparations for a nuclear weapon-free
world. In many cases it can be said that the individual methodologies
and technologies for verification already exist. The problem is the
political agreement and the financial resources necessary to effectively
organize them. Under the CTBT, a global and reliable verification system
is already being completed. However, the financial system to maintain it
is not yet stable.
We should be aware that the military expenditures used to counter nuclear proliferation and the material and human resources used for the development, maintenance and management of nuclear weapons could be more efficiently used to ensure security if they were used for establishing a verification system.
TASK 2 (Efforts in the East Asian region)
Also, the development of cooperative relations on a regional scale is a prerequisite for effectively organizing a regional verification system. In this regard, the GOJ should make efforts for research and development on a regional verification system, with a view to establishing a NWFZ in Northeast Asia.
TASK 3 (Establishment of a study panel)
For Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, it would be a worthwhile project to launch an expert panel to study and uncover the potential problems in verification to maintain a gnuclear weapon-free worldh and to identify areas to be addressed further to the international community. When doing so, it could use as a foundation the experiences and expertise of the OPCW, CTBTO and IAEA. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention formulated by NGOs could also serve as a reference.
As for TASK 1, the Japanese government has expressed its intention to make possible contributions to improving verification capabilities, based on the recognition that verification is generally important.
However, the idea of the diversion of resources has never been expressed in the thinking of the GOJ. The US SSMP, as mentioned in the 5th item, has been stupendously funded, and the US budget relating to nuclear weapons is reported to be more than that during the Cold War era. The Japanese government has not expressed any concern about this situation.
As for TASK 2, as we mentioned in relation to the 12th item, military counter measures have been given priority in addressing regional tensions. Quite a few efforts have been made to develop regional verification systems.
As for TASK 3, the Japanese government has never considered such a plan.
As a whole, we give it a D grade.
Binding Negative Security Assurances (NSA)
2. The Conference reaffirms
that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute
guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The
Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five
nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls on the
Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review
Conference on this issue.
TASK 1: The GOJ should make
its policy clear regarding the necessity of legally binding NSA. It
should include the call in its UNGA resolution. It should then make necessary preparations so that the NPT Review
PrepCom can reach an agreement on how to attain legally binging NSA.
TASK 2: The GOJ should cancel
its improper idea of requesting the US to use nuclear weapons against
potential BCW attacks by the DPRK, and should pursue a regional security
arrangement based on the NSA, including the establishment of a NWFZ in
TASK 1 (Clarification of position and active efforts)
At the decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, four states -- the US, Russia, the UK and France -- declared that they would neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon States that are parties to the NPT, unless attacked by such a state that is allied with a state possessing nuclear weapons. China declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance. The UNSC resolution 984 on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, of April 11, 1995, reaffirmed the contents of those declarations. Assuring security, in this way, by pledging not to use nuclear weapons is called the Negative Security Assurances (NSA), but it is not yet legally binding.
However, unless the nuclear weapon States assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States that make legal pledges not to acquire nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon States would suffer an great disadvantage by acceding to the NPT. In other words, NSA is an important requirement, and can be said to be a foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
With regard to negotiations to make the NSA legally binding thus far, an Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances was established in the CD in 1998, but it not been reestablished since then. The aforementioned Amorim proposal (August 24, 2001) suggests the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate on NSA, with a vague expression that the garrangements (agreed by the Committee) could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.h Some objections have also been expressed about the appropriateness of the CD as the body to negotiate on the NSA.
The Japanese government has not been active towards legally binding NSA. The working paper submitted by the Japanese government to the 2000 NPT Review Conference did not include this item. The 2000 UNGA Path Resolution did not call for it either. In order to take advantage of the 2000 NPT agreement, the Japanese government should make its position clear and make positive efforts toward the coming Review PrepCom.
TASK 2 (Abandon the idea of nuclear deterrence against BCW)
The Japanese government has suggested that its position is that it needs to maintain the option that the US will use nuclear weapons against potential BCW attacks by the DPRK. This position, which overrides the statement on nuclear deterrence in the National Defense Program Outline, that gagainst the threat of nuclear weapons, (Japan) relies on the US nuclear deterrent,h expands the concept of nuclear deterrence to respond to non-nuclear threats. It is not only a violation of the National Defense Program Outline, but also an expansion that violates the provision of gthe diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policyh in item 9e of the 2000 NPT agreements.
Even if the alleged BCWs or ballistic missiles of the DPRK pose threats to Japan, they should be dealt with in the framework of arms control of BCW and missile negotiations or in the process of negotiations toward a NWFZ in Northeast Asia.
As for TASK 1, the Japanese Path Resolution in the UNGA did not address legally binding NSA. On the other hand, the GOJ voted in support of the resolution for legally binding NSA proposed by Pakistan and others. The attitude of the Japanese government can be characterized as not opposing but not being positive on this task. This is one of the important differences between Japan and the New Agenda countries. We strongly recommend that the GOJ improve its policy on this.
With regard to TASK 2, although the Japanese government has not officially expressed a position in support, it has neither clearly confirmed its opposition to the gnon-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats.h This continued ambiguity should not be allowed for the country devastated by nuclear weapons. This task has much to do with item 9e, and Japan is urged to make a fundamental change in its security policy.
As a whole, we give it a D grade.
of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
6. The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken
to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and
reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally
recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely
arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and
regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation
regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear
TASK 1: The GOJ should continue its activities in support of the
establishment of a Central Asia NWFZ.
TASK 2: The GOJ government should provide possible assistance to promote
a nuclear weapon-free Southern Hemisphere, including supporting UNGA
resolutions to that effect.
TASK 3: The GOJ should adopt a policy to promote the establishment of a
Northeast Asia NWFZ, and then take actual steps.
1 (Assistance for a Central Asia NWFZ)
The Japanese government has expressed its support of NWFZs in general.
It has been working actively towards the establishment of a Central Asia NWFZ that covers the five countries of Kyrgyz, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Specifically, prior to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it hosted the conferences to draft the treaty in Sapporo, Japan. (The First meeting was held from October 5 to 8, 1999, and the Second from April 3 to 6, 2000.) Those efforts have not born fruit thus far, but they have been highly appreciated.
The military environment in Central Asia has changed heavily due to the US military attack on Afghanistan subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001. Fortunately the basic agreement on the establishment of a Central Asia NWFZ has been confirmed by a UNGA resolution thereafter. As the situation is getting more complicated, Japanfs constant support remains essential.
TASK 2 (Support and cooperation for a Nuclear-Free Southern
Among the international efforts to expand NWFZ is the effort to establish NWFZ status for the whole Southern Hemisphere, by combining the existing four NWFZs in the Southern Hemisphere in some form. The UNGA resolutions initiated by Brazil and co-sponsored by many states in the Southern Hemisphere have been adopted with overwhelming support since 1996. The GOJ abstained from voting in the early years, but it has been voting in favor since 1998. The US, the UK and France have consistently voted against such resolutions. This is an attractive approach toward a nuclear weapon-free world, and Japan should actively support it.
TASK 3 (Promotion of a Northeast Asia NWFZ)
With regard to the establishment of a Northeast Asian NWFZ, in which Japan itself is a concerned party, the GOJ has maintained a negative attitude. On the other hand, there have been various proposals made by international experts and NGOs. In Japan, the Peace Declarations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have repeatedly called for such a NWFZ. In addition, many political parties have expressed their support for the idea.
If the GOJ proposes to establish a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, it would greatly contribute to the relaxation of tensions and confidence building in the region, as well as to global nuclear disarmament. We already argued on this point in relation to items 9e and 11.
The concrete steps to be taken should include efforts to expedite talks for the normalization of the Japan-DPRK relationship, which will encourage the DPRK to become involved in dialogues for regional issues, and to call on the US government, which is responsible for the current stagnation of the KEDO process, to comply strictly with the agreements in the US-DPRK Agreed Framework.
As for TASK 1, though we cannot expect a rapid development, Japanfs systematic support continues and should be appreciated.
As for TASK 2, the GOJ has continued to support the 2001 UNGA resolutions for a nuclear weapon-free Southern Hemisphere. The UNGA resolution is remarkable in calling for an international conference where all the States parties to the existing NWFZ treaties will get together. However, Japan has not expressed its specific support for the idea of such a conference in a positive way.
With regard to the establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ as set forth in TASK 3, there has been no sign of change in the GOJfs negative attitude. NGOs ask, gWe understand it will take some time to attain a Northeast Asia NWFZ. But even a political declaration for it will have a great significance. Why canft you do that?h The only response to this question by the GOJ has been as follows. gIt is premature.h
Although we appreciate the GOJfs efforts for a Central Asia
NWFZ, the negative attitude to the idea involving Japan itself is so
serious that we must give it a D grade.
Anti-Ballistic Missile System
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Conference on Disarmament
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(Preparatory Commission of the) CTBT Organization
Chemical Weapons Convention
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Entry into Force
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